Féin to the first five years of Fianna Fáil (1926-1931 
Introduction
A consensus has emerged in recent years regarding the series of events, and the underlying circumstances, which led to the Sinn Féin split and the resultant establishment of Fianna Fáil. Though never the subject of much academic study, the verdict commonly expressed is that the Republican Party was dying, and that de Valera jumped from the Sinn Féin Titanic before it hit the iceberg of another electoral test. So common is this belief -bolstered sometimes by reference to articles and letters composed by those who were to become the Fianna Fáil political elite -that few have attempted to produce any quantitative data to substantiate it. An isolated though influential attempt to do just that has been provided by two lengthy articles written by Peter Pyne published forty years ago in the Economic and Social Review (Pyne 1969 : 29-50, Pyne 1970 ). Pyne's analysis, which remains a seminal and ground-breaking study, has provided the basis for many subsequent assumptions regarding the vicissitudes of the Sinn Féin Party from the end of the Civil War to the founding of Fianna Fáil. R.K. Carty, for example, writes that Sinn Féin's 'early successes in establishing an organisation proved to be ephemeral, and by 1924 their party was disintegrating' but his sole source for this definitive judgement is Pyne's study. (Carty, 1981: 101) . In his major work on Fianna Fáil Richard Dunphy cites Pyne as his source to relate the familiar story of falling cumainn numbers, a worsening financial position combined with 'extremely disappointing' election results including the by-election 'defeat' of March 1925. This leads Dunphy to state unequivocally that 'Sinn Féin had gone into a state of steady decline by 1924'. (Dunphy, 1995: 65) Similarly, in his book "Explaining Irish Democracy", Bill
Kissane cites Pyne to argue that Sinn Féin's 'poor showing in a by-election in 1925 apparently convinced de Valera finally of the need to abandon the abstentionist policy. Given that a decline in the party's fortunes was apparent from almost every indicator, it was not surprising that "various elements within the republican movement began to question the party's performance and the efficacy of its policies". Mounting pressure for a reassessment of Sinn Fein's political strategy led to a division within the republican movement'. (Kissane, 2002: 171, see also Kissane: 2001: 3)
The parameters of Pyne's investigation are the years [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] , and an attempt is made to document what is perceived to be the inexorable decline of the "Third Sinn Féin Party". Taking that as his starting point, Pyne attempts to elucidate the 'factors contributing to [the party's] collapse'. (Pyne, 1970: 229) . Three criteria are employed as barometers to gauge the organisational health of Sinn Féin -the financial position of the party; the number of party branches; and the support received in the various elections contested by the organisation. In this brief review, I hope to demonstrate that while Pyne's facts are accurate, they are insufficiently contextualised. More particularly, a glance at the performance of Fianna Fáil in these three crucial areas during its formative years suggests that Pyne's main conclusionthat the Sinn Féin party experienced terminal decline between 1923 and 1926 -is worthy of interrogation.
Party finances
Pyne notes that Sinn Féin's income for the year 1923-1924 was £26,000, which included a contribution of £20,000 from American supporters to contribute towards the cost of contesting the 1923 election. During the following year (1924) (1925) , income dropped by a third to £17,000, the bulk of which consisted of American donations.
ii Between 1925 and 1926 (Pyne, 1969: 42) . (Prager, 1986: 210 By-elections tended to favour the government during the early years of the state.
Between 1922 and 1947, the ruling party retained 79% of government vacancies and took 63% of opposition vacancies (Gallagher 1996: 43) . This was in part due to the exorbitant cost of contesting a by-election, which usually reduced the number of contenders to two or three. As all other parties in the field had accepted the Treaty and supported the Free State, Cumann na nGaedheal benefited from attracting all pro- November 1924 p. 5).
The party paper declared that Sinn Féin had gained in seats and votes despite the fact that the entire print media was 'virulently opposed to the Republic' and had carried out a hostile campaign to vilify the Republican leadership and distort the party's aims.
In response to Sinn Féin's increased polls, the daily press had attributed republican success to 'skilful propaganda' but 'if it were a matter of propaganda, eight daily Moreover, Sinn Féin's vote was hard-core and loyal. On one of the rare occasions when one of its candidates was eliminated in a by-election, its vote was overwhelmingly non-transferable. Faced with a choice in Cavan between supporting
Cumann na nGaedheal or a popular farmer candidate, almost four fifths of republicans declined to register a preference, the prospect of dislodging a government party candidate being insufficiently tempting. Fianna Fáil and Others, 1927-1931. Adapted from Gallagher (1993) pp. 113, 144-45 .
Conclusion
When it comes to the Sinn Féin party of the mid-1920s, how are we to measure decline? That there existed a large body within Sinn Féin who wished for a new departure is beyond dispute (Dunphy 1995 , Murphy 1991 , Fanning 1983 , Farrell 1983 , Coogan, 1993 ) but less clear is whether this was a symptom of decline or its cause. Just as one can talk oneself into a recession, a party can talk itself into decline.
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the motivation of the key members of eager to divest itself of the more doctrinaire, and less election focused elements within the party. The data employed by Pyne, however, certainly does not support his trenchant conclusion that Sinn Féin declined 'from its position as the second largest party in the country to that of a very minor organisation on the fringe of the political scene within the space of three years' (Pyne, 1970: 252 The net decline was 235 cumainn: 52 new cumainn were established 287 disappeared. ix The IRA had leant Sinn Féin £14,000 to fight the 1922 election, all of which had been raised in America. The Irish Republican Prisoners Dependents Fund (IRPDF) continued to provide basic sustenance to the families of republican prisoners. Forty thousand pounds had been given by the Republican "Government" to the IRPDF by the summer of 1924, a colossal sum by the standards of the time but was still unable to meet requirements. The 1923 hunger strike alone had cost £3000 (Comhairle na dTeachtaí Minutes, 8 August 1924) x Had a larger percentage of his vote transferred Sinn Féin's candidate, Philip Baxter, could easily have secured victory for the farmer candidate, John O'Hanlon, who lost by less than 900 votes whereas over 7,500 Sinn Féin votes did not travel. xi Moreover, if we are to take the same three year time period as Pyne does for Sinn Féin (until 1929 in the case of Fianna Fáil) then Fianna Fáil won none of the half-dozen by-elections it contested, while the government party won all six taking one from Fianna Fáil, one from an Independent deputy, and one from the Irish Workers League (Jim Larkin). xii This apathy or hostility was not always shared by the candidates themselves. Tom Maguire, for example, had been a Sinn Féin TD for Mayo South since 1922 had wanted to defend his seat but was over-ruled by the party leadership. He was told by the IRA Executive that he would be expelled from that organisation should he stand. See interview with Tom Maguire (MacEoin 1987: 301) . xiii The first by-election in Dublin County was necessitated by the assassination of Kevin O'Higgins and took place on the 14 August 1927. The results were: Cumann na 966; 126; 332 . The other by-election in Dublin South was caused by the death of Countess Markievicz and took place on 24 August 1927. The results were: Cumann na nGaedheal -24,139; Fianna Fáil -18,647; Sinn Féin -1,115 (Gallagher 1993: 113) xiv In fairness, Pyne himself makes modest claims at the outset, stating that his study 'is offered only as an investigation of a preliminary nature, for synthesis must await the study of all relevant sources'. Pyne, (1969) , 1/1, p. 29.
